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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
EUGENE ABE, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
GREEN RIVER DEVELOPMENT 
ASSOCIATES, INC., 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 940149-CA 
Priority No. 15 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant 
to UCA 78-2-2(3). The Supreme Court has transferred this case to 
the Court of Appeals pursuant to UCA 78-2-2(4). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Was the evidence sufficient to find that Plaintiff had 
made out an implied-in-fact contract? The standard for review of 
this issue is that, once the evidence is marshaled in a manner most 
favorable to the trial court's decision, including all inferences 
that can be reasonably drawn from it, an appellate court will 
uphold the judgment if the findings are not clearly erroneous. 
Christensen v. Munns, 812 P..2d 69, 73 (Utah App. 1991). 
2. Were the trial court's findings of fact as to the 
existence of an implied-in-fact contract against the clear weight 
of the evidence? The standard for review of this issue is that an 
appellate court will not set aside the trial court's factual 
findings unless they are clearly erroneous, "if the findings...are 
against the clear weight of the evidence, or if the appellate court 
otherwise reaches a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has 
been made." Brixen & Christopher, Arch. v. Elton, 777 P.2d 1039, 
1042 (Utah App. 1989) (quoting State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 
[Utah 1987]). 
3. Was the evidence sufficient to support the trial court's 
finding as to damages? The standard for review of this issue is 
that an appellate court will not set aside the findings unless they 
are clearly erroneous. Brixon & Christopher, Arch, v. Elton, supra, 
at 1042; Christensen v. Munns, supra, at 73. 
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITIES 
There are no determinative authorities in regards to the 
issues of the case. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a trial involving an action for damages 
due to a breach of an implied in fact contract. 
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
The case was tried to the Court, the Honorable Bruce K. 
Halliday presiding, on June 11, 1993. On July 13, 1993, the Court 
entered its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and a judgment 
(attached hereto as Addendum Number 1). 
C. DISPOSITION BY THE TRIAL COURT 
The trial court entered a judgment in favor of Plaintiff and 
2 
against the Defendant. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Mr. Abe is a resident of Arizona and was employed by the 
Defendant to be the general manager of a truck stop, motel, and 
restaurant. Trial, Tr. 3-4.1 Mr. Abe had an oral understanding 
with his employer as to the terms of his services and compensation. 
Tr. 5. He left his employment in 1991 in order to seek employment 
elsewhere. Tr.5. The basic terms of his employment were that in 
return for his management services he was to be paid a salary, 
receive a share of profits, and to take a period of time off for 
vacation. Tr.5. The Court found, in reviewing the evidence and 
credibility of the witnesses, that an implied-in-fact contracted 
existed between the parties. Tr. 140-141; Findings of Fact, 
Paragraph 4, Conclusions of Law, Paragraph 1. 
The Defendant claimed that Mr. Abe was only entitled to a 
bonus if he were working on the April following the end of the year 
the bonus was to be calculated. However, the Court ruled, after 
considering the testimony and credibility of the witnesses, that 
this contention was not part of the parties' understanding and that 
the bonus should be calculated on a prorated basis. Tr. 141; 
Findings of Fact, Paragraph 6. 
There remained the question of the manner in which to 
calculate the bonus due Mr. Abe for 1991. Mr. Abe was to receive 
bonuses in the form of payments to him based on a percentage of the 
1
 The trial transcript is found at R. 45-191. References to 
the trial record are to the pages in the original transcript. 
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business net profit. Tr.6. He received such bonuses for the years 
1989 and 1990. Tr.6. Mr. Abe claimed that he was entitled to a 
partial bonus for the one-half of 1991 that he worked. The total 
of his percentage of the net profit of the three truck stop 
businesses for the time period he was employed in 1991 (one-half 
year) was $6,522.39. Tr.7-8. The Court determined that Mr. Abe was 
due one-half of the bonus for 1991. Tr.141; Memorandum Decision, 
Page 1 (attached hereto as Addendum Number 2). The Court ruled 
that the bonus would have to be calculated on a prorated basis for 
the time he was employed. Tr. 141. The Court accordingly 
calculated the one-half year amount due Mr. Abe on the basis of the 
sums paid to Plaintiff's successor for 1991, $11,000.00, and by 
considering other compensation, Tr. 92, arrived at an award of 
$5,500.00. Findings of Fact, Paragraph 9, Conclusions of Law, 
Paragraph 3. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The evidence was sufficient in regards to the trial court's 
finding that an implied-in-fact contract existed between the 
parties. Appellant failed to marshal the evidence in a manner most 
favorable to the trial court's decision. This Court should 
therefore assume that the record supports the findings of the trial 
court. 
The trial court findings were not against the clear weight of 
the evidence. Appellant failed to marshal the evidence. This 
Court should therefore assume that the record supports the findings 
of the trial court. 
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The evidence was sufficient to support the trial court's 
determination of damages. Appellant failed to marshal the evidence 
and demonstrate why the trial court's damage calculations were 
clearly erroneous. This Court should therefore assume that the 
record supports the findings of the trial court. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
THE EVIDENCE IS SUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH 
AN IMPLIED-IN-FACT CONTRACT. 
The Supreme Court has only recently recognized implied-in-fact 
contracts. Berube v. Fashion Centre, Ltd., 771 P.2d 1033, 1044-1045 
(Utah 1989). The Courts can hold that a contractual relationship 
arises from a variety of practices, including the conduct of the 
parties, personnel policies, and other circumstances. Berube, 
supra, at 1044 (citing Puqh v. See's Candies, Inc., 171 Cal.Rptr. 
917 [Cal. App. 1981]). The existence of an implied-in-fact 
agreement is a question of fact "which turns on the objective 
manifestations of the parties' intent." Johnson v. Morton Thiokol, 
Inc., 818 P.2d 997, 1001 (Utah 1991). The Johnson Court, at 1002, 
also held that a unilateral contract analysis governs the question 
of implied-in-fact contracts.2 The understanding between Mr. Abe 
and Green River Development Associates complies with the Johnson 
2
 Johnson, at 1002, stated that "[u]nder a unilateral contract 
analysis, an employer's promise of employment under certain terms 
and for an indefinite period constitutes both the terms of the 
employment contract and the employer's consideration for the 
employment contract. The employee's performance of service 
pursuant to the employer's offer constitutes both the employee's 




Green River Development Associates, through one of its 
officers, offered Mr. Abe employment as the manager of their truck 
stop, motel, and restaurant operation at Green River, Utah. Tr. 4, 
75-66. See, Johnson v. Morton Thiokol, Inc., supra, at 1001-1002. 
The terms of the employment were that Mr. Abe would (1) manage the 
business operation and in return receive $40,000.00 a year, (2) 
receive a share of profits (10% for the restaurant and motel, and 
5% of the truck stop), and (3) receive four weeks vacation. Tr. 5; 
Findings of Fact, Paragraph 5. Johnson, supra, at 1002. The terms 
of the contract were definite. Tr. 5; Findings of Fact, Paragraph 
5; Johnson, supra, at 1002. The terms of the parties' 
understanding were established by virtue of the oral statements and 
conversations that Mr. Abe had with the company's corporate 
officer, Mr William Greaves. Findings of Fact, Paragraph 4. The 
Court established some of the terms of employment from facts which 
were in dispute by the parties, and resolved each such conflict by 
reviewing the testimony and determining the credibility of the 
witnesses. Findings of Fact, Paragraphs 6-8. Mr. Abe performed 
services pursuant to this understanding. Tr. 5. See, Johnson, 
supra, at 1002. Green River Development paid to Mr. Abe wages and 
bonuses for services rendered pursuant to the agreement. Tr. 5-6. 
The evidence accepted by the Court clearly established an implied-
in-fact contract. 
The Supreme Court has specifically ruled that evidence of 
conduct and oral statements may establish an implied-in-fact 
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contract even where no written policies or documents exist. Hodgson 
v. Bunzl Utah, Inc., 844 P.2d 331, 334 (Utah 1992). The Court, at 
334, also stated that the evidence supporting such an agreement 
must be "strong enough to overcome the presumption of at-will 
employment and any inconsistent written policies and disclaimers." 
There were no written documents, consistent or inconsistent, which 
were crucial to a determination of the parties understanding. Tr.4, 
101-102; Findings of Fact, Paragraph 3. The evidence accepted by 
the Court as to the existence and terms of a contract was certainly 
strong enough to overcome any presumption to the contrary. 
Appellant is obliged to marshal the evidence in a manner most 
favorable to the trial court's decision before making an argument 
that the evidence is insufficient. Christensen v. Munns. supra. 
However, Green River Development Associates merely recites portions 
of the record supporting factual arguments that were rejected by 
the trial court. See, e.g., Appellant's Brief, Pages 9-10 (method 
and manner of calculating bonus payment). Moreover, Green River 
Development Associates makes no argument that elements of the 
contract other than in regards to the bonus calculation were not 
established by sufficient evidence. Mr. Abe has demonstrated that 
there was adequate evidence supporting the existence of an 
implied-in-fact contract. The evidence also was sufficient to 
establish the terms of the parties' understanding. The argument of 
Green River Development Associates that the evidence is 
insufficient to support the judgment is simply incorrect. 
POINT TWO 
7 
THE FINDINGS ARE ADEQUATE TO ESTABLISH 
AN IMPLIED-IN-FACT CONTRACT. 
The Court found Mr. Abe was engaged to manage and operate a 
restaurant and truck at stop at Green River, Utah. Findings of 
Fact, Paragraph 2, Page 2. There was no written agreement 
summarizing the terms of this business relationship. Findings of 
Fact, Paragraph 2, Page 2. Mr. Abe and a company representative 
had conversations, and statements were made, which established the 
contractual relationship. Findings of Fact, Paragraph 4, Page 2. 
The Court also held that the parties' acts in performance of the 
agreement also established the terms of the contractual 
relationship. Findings of Fact, Paragraph 4, Page 2. 
The trial court determined that all terms of the contractual 
relationship were clearly established. The Court found that Mr. 
Abe was to be paid a salary. Findings of Fact, Paragraph 5, Page 2. 
He was also to receive a bonus, based on a percentage of the 
business profits. Findings of Fact, Paragraph 5, Page 2. The 
Court, after reviewing the testimony and assessing the credibility 
of the witnesses, expressly rejected the contention that Mr. Abe 
must have been employed on the date of the disbursement of the 
bonus in order to be entitled to that payment. Findings of Fact, 
Paragraph 6, Page 7. 
Green River Development Associates is obligated to marshal all 
relevant evidence that tends to support the findings and 
demonstrate why the findings are clearly erroneous. West Valley 
City v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311, 1313 (Utah App. 1991). 
Appellant has failed to properly set out the facts. No meaningful 
8 
argument is made as to why the evidence fails to support the 
findings. An appellate court must therefore assume that the record 
supports the findings of the trial court. Wade v. Stanql, 232 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 19, 21 (Utah App. 1994). This Court should uphold the 
trial court's findings in every respect. 
Green River Development Associates argues that there is 
evidence which shows that Mr. Abe was not eligible for the bonus 
because he was not working at the time the bonus was to be 
disbursed. However, the trial court rejected this contention and 
believed Mr. Abe's narrative of the facts. Findings of Fact, 
Paragraphs 6-7, Page 2. The trial court is in the best position to 
determine the credibility of the witnesses. Rule 52(a), U.R.C.P 
(due regard given to opportunity of trial court to judge 
credibility of witnesses); Adoption of McKinstray v. McKinstrav, 
628 P.2d 1286, 1289 (Utah 1981) (court's findings reflect 
consideration of believability of witnesses' testimony). An 
appellate court should not second guess this function. State v. 
Wright, 744 P.2d 315, 317 (Utah App. 1987); Henderson v. For-Shor 
Co. , 757 P.2d 465 (Utah App. 1988) (clearly erroneous standard does 
not eliminate the deference traditionally accorded the fact finder 
to determine the credibility of the witnesses). Appellate courts 
usually defer to a trial court's factual assessment unless there is 
clear error. Rule 52(a), U.R.C.P; Copper State Leasing Co. v. 
Blacker Appliance & Furn. Co., 770 P.2d 88 (Utah 1988).3 Appellant 
3
 In State v. Bagley, 681 P.2d 1242, 1244 (Utah 1984), the 
Supreme Court said: "It is not our function to determine the 
credibility of conflicting evidence or the reasonable inferences to 
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has demonstrated no such shortcoming. The findings are therefore 
adequate and should not be disturbed on appeal. 
POINT THREE 
THE COURT'S FINDINGS ARE ADEQUATE BECAUSE 
THE EVIDENCE IS SUFFICIENT AS TO DAMAGES. 
The Supreme Court has held that damages which are so 
speculative as to be without a rational basis in the evidence 
should not be upheld. Bastian v. King, 661 P.2d 953, 956 (Utah 
1983). However, the Bastian court also stated: 
"...it is generally recognized that some degree of uncertainty 
in the evidence of damages will not suffice to relieve a 
defendant from recompensing a wronged plaintiff. As long as 
there is some rational basis for a damage award, it is the 
wrongdoer who must assume the risk of some uncertainty 
Winshness v. M.J. Conoco Distributors, Utah, 593 P.2d 130 3 
(1979). Where there is evidence of the fact of damage, a 
defendant may not escape liability because the amount of 
damage cannot be proved with precision." 
The Court of Appeals has taken the same position. Price-Orem v. 
Rollins, Brown & Gunnell, 784 P.2d 475, 478 n. 1 & 479 (Utah App. 
1989 (citing Sampson v. Richins, 770 P.2d 998, 1007 [Utah App. 
1989]) .4 
The Supreme Court has held that "The level of persuasiveness 
be drawn therefrom." 
4
 The Utah Supreme Court has also held that the rule against 
recovery of uncertain damages is usually directed against 
uncertainty with respect to cause rather than to measure or extent, 
so that a party who has broken his contract will not ordinarily be 
permitted to escape liability because of uncertainty in amount of 
damage resulting, and the fact that the full extent of damages for 
breach of contract must be a matter of speculation is not ground 
for refusing all damages." Terry v. Panek, 631 P.2d 896, 898 (Utah 
1981) (citing Winshness v. M.J. Conoco Distributors, Utah, supra, 
and Gould v. Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph Co., 309 P.2d 
802, 805 [Utah 1957]). 
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required to establish the fact of loss is generally higher than 
that required to establish the amount of a loss." Atkin Wright & 
Miles v. Mountain States Tel. , 709 P.2d 330, 336 (Utah 1985) 
(citing Cook Associates v. Warnick, Utah, 664 P.2d 1161, 1166 [Utah 
1983] and Gould v. Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Co., 
supra). In Atkin, supra, at 336, the Supreme Court stated that 
the rationale for this approach is that "[i]t is after all, the 
wrongdoer, rather than the injured party, who should bear the 
burden of some uncertainty in the amount of damages...there still 
must be evidence that rises above speculation and provides a 
reasonable, even though not necessarily precise, estimate of 
damages" (citations omitted). 
The Supreme Court has stated: "Damages are properly measured 
by amounts necessary to place the non-breaching party in as good a 
position as if the contract had been performed" Alexander v. Brown, 
646 P.2d 692, 695 (Utah 1982) (citing Keller v. Deseret Mortuary 
Co., 455 P.2d 197 [Utah 1969]). See, also, Craig Food Industries, 
Inc. v. Weihing, 746 P.2d 279, 284 (Utah App. 1987) (citing Robert 
v. Anderson, 681 P.2d 1326, 1333 [Wyo. 1984]). In that regard, 
Plaintiff need only demonstrate the amount of damages with 
"sufficient certainty" to permit the fact finder to make an award, 
although the damages need not be proven with precision. Turtle 
Management, Inc. v. Haggis Management, 645 P.2d 667, 671 (Utah 
1982) (citing 5A Corbin, Contracts, Section 1022 [1964]). 
This Court has held that [w]here evidence is controverted, we 
assume that the trial judge believed those aspects of the evidence 
11 
and the inferences reasonably drawn from them that support his 
decision." Brixen & Christopher, Arch, v. Elton, supra, at 1042 
(citing Redevelopment Agency of Salt Lake City v. Tanner, 740 P.2d 
1296, 1302 [Utah 1987]). The Court concluded that the bonus amount 
due Mr. Abe would under no circumstances be less than one-half of 
the total bonus paid to his successor. Since that sum was 
$11,000.00, Mr. Abe was awarded half, or $5,500.00. Memorandum 
Decision, Pages 1-2; Findings of Fact, Paragraph 9; Conclusions of 
Law, Paragraph 3. The record in this case fully supports the 
judge's conclusions. 
Mr. Greaves, the president of Green River Development 
Associates, testified that the manager received $11,000.00. 
Memorandum Decision, Page 2; Tr. 89-92. The Court also based the 
decision as to the amount of damages, in part, on the sums that Mr. 
Abe received the one full year that he was working and received a 
bonus. Tr. 143. Considerable testimony was received concerning the 
bonus for past years. E.g., Tr. 89-92. The Court considered this 
data and made a decision as to the amount due Mr. Abe. This 
amount, while not a precise calculation, falls within the 
acceptable limits that trial courts are allowed when determining 
damages. Green River Development Associates demonstrated no 
failing in the evidence which was clearly erroneous.5 The trial 
5
 Green River Development Associates failed to marshal the 
evidence as to damages in a manner most favorable to the trial 
court's decision. Christensen v. Munns, supra. Appellant also 
failed to demonstrate why the damage calculations were clearly 
erroneous. West Valley v. Majestic Inv. Co., supra. This Court 
should therefore assume that the record supports the findings of 
the trial court. Wade v. Stanql, supraf at 21. 
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court's findings are therefore not clearly erroneous and should be 
sustained by this Court. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court should affirm the judgment, and award Mr. Abe his 
costs on appeal. 
Dated this 17th day of March, 1994. 
Eric P. Swenson 
Attorney for Appellee 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
Eric P. Swenson, attorney for Appellee, hereby certifies that 
he did mail two true and correct copies of the foregoing Brief to 
George S. Diumenti II, Diumenti, Lewis & Hart, 505 South Main 
Street, Bountiful, Utah, 84010, this 17th day of March, 1994. 
Dated this 17th day of March, 1994. 
Eric P. Swenson 
Attorney for Appellee 
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IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, GRAND COUNTY 




GREEN RIVER DEVELOPMENT 
ASSOCIATES, INC., A Utah 
Corporation, 
DEFENDANT, 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
CIVIL NO. 9207-48 
This matter came on for trial on the 11th day of June, 1993, 
the Honorable Bruce K. Halliday, presiding. 
Plaintiff was present and represented by his attorney, Eric P. 
Swenson. 
Defendant was present through a corporate officer and 
represented by its attorney, George S. Diumenti II. 
The Court having heard the evidence and the arguments of the 
parties, having entered a Memorandum Decision, and now therefore 
enters the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Plaintiff is a resident of Tuba City, Arizona, and 
formerly a manager of the Defendants' restaurant and truck stop 
business in Green River, Utah. 
2. The Defendant Green River Development Associates, Inc., is 
a Utah corporation, and conducts a restaurant and truck stop 
business located in Green River, Grand County, Utah. 
3. Plaintiff was engaged to manage and operate Defendant's 
business in Green River, Utah. There was no written agreement. 
A Defendant hired Plaintiff pursuant to an implied in fact 
employment contract. This contract, and its terms, were 
established by virtue of the oral statements and conversations that 
Plaintiff had with Defendant's corporate officer, William Greaves, 
and by virtue of the ongoing acts of the parties as they performed 
pursuant to said agreement. 
5. The terms of the employment contract were that Plaintiff 
was to be paid $40,000.00 per year in twelve equal monthly 
payments. The parties' obligations under the employment contract 
were to be performed on an ongoing and annual basis. In addition, 
Plaintiff received a 10% bonus of the profits of the restaurant and 
motel operation and a 5% bonus of the profit of the truck stop. 
The profits of the various businesses were determined by the use of 
"reconstructed profit and loss statements" and compilation reports, 
and the statements pertaining to the periods in question were 
admitted without objection and marked as Plaintiff's Exhibit 1. 
The bonus payments were made by Defendant to the Plaintiff for the 
years 1989 and 1990. 
6. Defendant contends that bonus payments were, as a term of 
2 
the agreement, contingent on Plaintiff's having been employed on 
the date of the disbursement of the bonus, or April of each year. 
However, the Court, in reviewing the testimony and credibility of 
the witnesses, determines that no such understanding of the parties 
had i1, I .• '" occurred. 
7. The Court has examined Exhibit ] , and considered the 
testimony and demeanor of the witnesses, and determines that no 
additional bonus payments were due Plaintiff for the year 1990. 
8. The Court, in considering the testimony and demeanor of 
the witnesses, determines that the Plaintiff is not entitled to 
compensation for vacation time for 1991 in part due to Plaintiff's 
absences from the business. 
9. Plaintiff is entitled to a bonus payment from the 
Defendant for the year 1991. The amount of this bonus payment is 
no less than one-half of the total bonus paid to Plaintiff's 
successor ($11,000.00), or $5,500.00. 
10. Plaintiff is entitled to his costs and should submit a 
cost bill and include the same in the proposed judgment. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The Court concludes that an implied in fact employment 
contract existed between the Plaintiff and the Defendant. 
2. The Court concludes that the statute of frauds does not 
apply to this the employment contract because the contractual 
obligations were to be performed on an ongoing and annual basis. 
3. Plaintiff is therefore to be awarded the sum of $5,500 I 
which is the bonus payment due for 1991. Plaintiff is not entitled 
3 
to a bonus payment for 1990. Plaintiff is further not entitled to 
a cash payment for the vacation time. 
4. Plaintiff is entitled/to his-costs of bring this action. 
Dated this & day of^fflY^l.993. 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
4 
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GREEN RIVER DEVELOPMENT 
ASSOCIATES, INC., A Utah 
Corporation, 
Defendant. 
: MEMORANDUM DECISION 
: Civil NO. 9207-48 
: Judge Bruce K. Halliday 
This matter, upon stipulation of counsel for change of 
venue, was tried to the Court, Bruce K. Halliday, District Judge 
presiding on the 11th day of June, 1993 in Price, Carbon County, 
State of Utah, Plaintiff was present represented by Eric Swenson 
his attorney; defendant was represented by its attorney Mr. 
George Diumenti and was present by and through its president, Mr. 
William S. Grieves. In hearing the testimony of the parties and 
arguments of the attorneys, the Court concluded on the day of 
trial that an employment contract existed; proof of same was not 
barred by the statute of frauds and took under advisement the 
amount of damages to be awarded based upon the bonuses earned. 
The Court has attempted to extrapolate from the evidence pre-
sented and has concluded that under no circumstances would the 
amount due and owing Mr. Abe for bonuses earned during the period 
of his employment be less than one-half of the total bonus which 
was paid to Mr. Allen Burns, Mr. Abe's successor. That amount 
Ruling 
ABE V. GREEN RIVER 
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was testified to be the sum of $11,000, one-half thereof being 
the sum of $5,500 and which the Court finds is the reasonable 
damages to be awarded to the defendant contrary to the damages 
which the defendant testified were $6,522,39 but based on only 
six months operating data. 
The Court finds that the plaintiff is not entitled to 
recover any additional bonus and/or amounts for the period 1990, 
nor is he entitled to recover any amounts for compensation for 
vacation time not taken by the plaintiff. 
The plaintiff is entitled to costs, but a cost bill 
should be provided by counsel. 
The Court directs the plaintiff to prepare findings, 
conclusions and judgment accordingly. 
DATED this ^ ^^L—--day of June, 1993. 
Bruce K. Halliday, Dis 
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